Effect of Adoption of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act on Existing Administrative Procedures in Washington by O\u27Connell, John J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 33 
Number 1 Symposium on Washington 
Administrative Law 
3-1-1958 
Effect of Adoption of the Model State Administrative Procedure 
Act on Existing Administrative Procedures in Washington 
John J. O'Connell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John J. O'Connell, Effect of Adoption of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act on Existing 
Administrative Procedures in Washington, 33 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 17 (1958). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol33/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
EFFECT OF ADOPTION OF THE MODEL STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT ON EXISTING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IN WASHINGTON
JOHN J. O'CONNELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF WASHINGTON*
There has developed as a natural incident to the state's growth and
the ever increasing responsibility of state government to its citizens a
large body of law which thirty years ago was virtually unknown. This
development arose from the consistent need for a more facile and effi-
cient method of disposing of the problems inherent in the complex
relationship between the state and the various activities of its citizens.
From the invention of the administrative process to the present, its
evolution has been piecemeal and stopgap. As particular immediate
problems have arisen, separate and distinct agencies and administrative
procedures have been created to meet them, with little consideration
being given to a comprehensive and co-ordinated program.
The absence of uniformity and co-ordination is perhaps best illus-
trated by reference to those agencies performing an administrative
function without substantial legislative direction, such as the Tax Com-
mission, and those agencies which operate under relatively rigid con-
trols, such as the Department of Employment Security. This lack of
uniformity has resulted in confusion of the public and members of the
bar practicing before administrative agencies.
Legal standards for the exercise of administrative powers have also
developed slowly and according to current needs. It is to the develop-
ment of this body of law that this article is devoted. Consistent with
this aim we have sought to restrict this discussion to the proposed
M\'odel State Administrative Procedure Act and its effect on the various
administrative processes currently in effect in Washington.
Because of limited space, this discussion will be restricted to an ex-
amination of agencies which are representative of the many varied and
separate administrative procedures in the state. Included is an ap-
pendix listing additional state agencies, the basis for their procedures
and other data.
EFFECT OF ADOPTION OF THE MODEL STATE ADmINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT IN WASHINGTON
The discussion to follow will show the variance in existing procedures
for the initiation and disposition of administrative proceedings among
* This article was prepared by staff members of the Office of the Attorney General,
under the direction of Mr. John J. O'Connell, Attorney General, and Mr. John W.
Riley, Chief Assistant Attorney General.
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various boards, commissions and agencies in the state of Washington.
In the appendix to this article is contained, in summary only, an
amalgam of data concerning other state agencies.
Some of the significant problems raised by the proposed Model Act
are: Would its adoption effectively reduce the wide variance of exist-
ing procedures and eliminate confusion in the state of Washington?
Would its adoption effectively provide any "assurance of fundamental
fairness in administrative hearings? Would its adoption effectively
give "assurance of proper scope of judicial review of administrative
orders to guarantee correction of administrative errors?"
It is to be noted that most of the major principles contained in the
Model Act are desirable. In essence they are:
1. Every agency to have and publish essential procedural rules.
2. Administrative rules so promulgated after notice and hearing to
be subject to declaratory judgments.
3. The use of liberal rules of evidence as established by section 9
of the Model Act.
4. Uniform method of appeal as provided by section 12.
A study conducted by the Attorney General's staff included detailed
discussions with administrators who are directly affected by the various
procedures. These administrators indicated a great reluctance to adopt
the Model Act in its present form. Uniformly, the view of persons
directly affected by the proposal is that although the major changes
sought to be accomplished are most desirable, the Act would fail to
achieve the uniformity of the fundamental rules of administrative pro-
cedure that is most sorely needed. As indicated by the appendix,
every agency in the state government has a different statute with respect
to the conduct of hearings, rendition of orders and method of appeal.
To summarize the variances and comparative efforts of the Model
Act upon the entire framework of administrative procedure within
the government of the state would, therefore, be a monumental and
prohibitive task. It is hoped, however, that the following summary
will provide some help to the reader in making his own decision as to
what course of action should be adopted.
Sections 2 through 5 of the Model Act, dealing with the adoption,
filing and publication of agency rules, uniformly present conflicts
with existing procedures in effect in this state. The immediate prob-
lems posed by the adoption of these provisions concern the mechanical
labor of abandoning current practices and complying with the new
ones, rather than the merits of the provisions as such. Compliance
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with these sections would necessitate the herculean task of compilation
and publication, after notice of hearing, of each of more than sixty
different sets of administrative rules of procedure, not to mention the
forms, instructions and descriptive statements of procedures, which,
under the provisions of the Model Act, must be filed with the Secre-
tary of State.
The difficulty for counsel presented by the variety of procedures in
current use would be alleviated, however, by the availability of pub-
lished rules of procedure. In this respect, sections 2 through 5 of the
Act suggest a useful device.
The heart and soul of the Model Act lies in sections 6 through 12,
and it might be well to examine their prospective effects separately.
Section 6, providing for declaratory judgments on the constitutional
validity of rules and the authority of the agency to promulgate par-
ticular rules, is redundant when considered with section 12, which
provides for appeals from administrative decisions. Certainly, the
power of the courts to determine constitutional questions and to
decide whether an agency has exceeded the scope of its statutory
authority is not limited to actions for declaratory judgments. Such
questions may be raised on appeal. By incorporating this section
providing for declaratory judgments, the Model Act not only dupli-
cates the provisions of section 12, but places an undue burden upon
state agencies by requiring them to defend such actions. Such a
proposition is expensive at best. It would seem that uniformity is not
so desirable that undue burdens and expenses should be imposed upon
agencies to dispose of questions which may be more adequately
answered on appeal from an administrative order or decision.
This provision is also inconsistent with the intent of section 7.
Under section 7 an agency may upon petition give any interested
person an administrative determination of the effect of rules and regu-
lations, by way of a declaratory ruling. This should be entirely
adequate, since a right of appeal from an adverse ruling is provided.
It appears unreasonable to give an agency the power to interpret its
own rules for the benefit of a party who might be injured by their
application and then nullify it by permitting this same party to
abandon this remedy and seek redress in the courts by filing an action
for a declaratory judgment.
Administrative agencies dispose of thousands of actual controver-
sies annually. If, then, every rule and regulation may be dragged
before the courts under section 6, proceedings would be interminably
1958]
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mired and the very purpose of administrative agencies, i.e., to attain
some degree of dispatch in administering the law, could become a
nullity.
Section 8, providing for notice and an opportunity for a hearing in
contested cases, does not eliminate variances in procedures, but goes
far to accomplish the purpose of the act to achieve the "assurance of
fundamental fairness in administrative hearings." Again, however, by
the language "each agency shall adopt appropriate rules of procedure
for notice and hearing in contested cases" the law neatly sidesteps
the fundamental problem of establishing uniformity at the administra-
tive level. As far as it goes, however, this section leaves little to be
desired, with the possible exception of too little emphasis on informal
proceedings.
Sections 9 and 12 would provide a desirable uniformity regarding
the admissibility of evidence and the method of judicial review. How-
ever, they would have little effect on present practices in the vast
majority of state agencies. As a matter of course, any evidence of
probative value is admissible at the administrative level. Minor vari-
ances in present procedure would result from the adoption of sections
9(2) and 9(4). Section 9(2) provides that all evidence, including
records and documents, shall be made a part of the record in the
case, and that the agency's determination shall be based solely on
matters contained in the record. Presently the usual practice is to
take notice of documents on file by stipulation of the parties. This
does not require the documents on file to become a physical part of
the record. Section 9(4) varies from standard procedure by requiring
that the hearing board give notice to the parties that it is taking
cognizance of facts within its particular sphere, and by providing that
an interested party may contest the facts so officially noticed. While
this represents a variance, the rule is salutory and in accordance with
good procedure.
Section 10 outlines the procedure for cases in which a majority of
the officials of the agency who are to render the final decision have
not heard or read the evidence. The application of this section would
create little difficulty in most agencies, but could raise a practical
question among those bodies conducting a large volume of hearings.
It is current practice, where trial examiners are used, such as in the
Public Service Commission, to submit a final order to the commis-
sioners for approval. Under section 10 only a proposed order could
be submitted, and the commissioners would be required to read tran-
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scripts from all proceedings. Volume, then, may be a considerable
factor as a practical matter.
In view of the great volume of orders issued by many of the state
agencies, the requirement of section 11 that every decision or order
be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law would
greatly burden the departments and would undoubtedly slow down
the time in which their orders could be issued. It might also require
a significant increase in personnel. At the present time there is some
general agitation among members of the bar to eliminate the neces-
sity of presenting findings of fact and conclusions of law in lawsuits
unless and until a notice of appeal has been filed. If that is the trend
in superior court actions, it would seem unwise to require such a pro-
cedure of administrative agencies.
It is readily discernable that as procedures become more and more
formal, the greater is the burden placed upon the agency. In most
cases, a high degree of informality is a decided advantage to the
administrator, and in practice has effectively eliminated onerous pro-
ceedings and appeals. In general, the types of procedure utilized by
the Tax Commission, where no record is made and de novo appeal is
available, is considered to be the least expensive and the most
effective.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
At the outset of the discussion of the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act three questions were posed. The proposed Act sup-
plies effective answers to two of them, in that it would, to some extent,
provide "assurance of fundamental fairness in administrative hear-
ings," and would give "assurance of proper scope of judicial review
of administrative orders to guarantee correction of administrative
errors." However, it is undoubtedly clear that the proposed Act
would fall far short of what is needed to "reduce the wide variance
of existing procedures and eliminate confusion in the state of
Washington."
The principal source of difficulty in this state is not that the admin-
istrative processes of particular agencies are themselves confusing,
but that there is absolutely no uniformity between the procedures of
various agencies. The approach of the Model Act to this problem is
at best backdoor. It is notable that throughout the Act the funda-
mental problem of lack of uniformity at the first level of administra-
tive procedure is consistently ignored.
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The Model Act seeks to gloss over the underlying chaos under the
guise of uniformity. The chaos remains, and the fact that it would not
be uniform would not conceal its existence. Standing alone, then,
the proposed Act does not have the capacity to fulfill its destiny. The
existing confusion inherent in the divergence of procedures among
various agencies would still be present.
With the notable exceptions of sections 6 and 11, the administra-
tive bodies of this state could learn to live with the Model Act, and,
in reality, few changes would have to be wrought in their present
practices. It is more than possible, however, that the Act in its prac-
tical application could precipitate a gross burden upon the adminis-
trators of most of the agencies presently conducting administrative
proceedings on a large scale.
It would be recommended, were such an act to be adopted, that
such agencies as the Washington State Liquor Control Board, the
Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles and certain
divisions of the Department of Licenses be exempted from its applica-
tion. In short, any agency performing functions going to the protection
and preservation of public health, safety and morals should be excluded
from the act, at least to the extent that their powers to act quickly
and summarily would be curtailed.
In the opinion of the majority of individuals concerned with admin-
istrative proceedings in this state, the best approach to the problem
would consist of legislative adoption of uniform basic rules of pro-
cedure for use by all state agencies. Supplemental rules necessary to
the functions peculiar to individual agencies would at least be less
voluminous and onerous in preparation, and the necessity of notice,
arduous public hearings and publication of many different sets of
rules would be resolved.
What the state of Washington really requires is an act establishing
a single uniform procedure for administrative hearings to be applied
equally to all its various boards, commissions and agencies. The right
and method of appeal from the orders and decisions of such boards,
commissions and agencies should similarly be made uniform. Such
fundamental legislation would alleviate the pressures for the adoption
of the Model Act, although the adoption of this Act as a companion
to, but not in lieu of, a basic act would be commendable.
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COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES BEFORE SELECTED AGENCIES
To demonstrate the variance between procedures utilized in the
conduct of hearings and the method of appeals, existing procedures of
the following agencies have been selected for summarization: Division
of Bankdng, Tax Commission, Pollution Control Commission, Liquor
Control Board and the Employment Security Department. All of these
agencies conduct a large number of hearings annually (see appendix)
and, since they illustrate the extremes of administrative procedures,
were felt to be ideal examples.
Division of Banldng.
This division is now incorporated into the relatively new Department
of General Administration. Within the department, in addition to the
Division of Banking, is the Division of Savings & Loans. Each is under
a separate supervisor, and the two represent the only divisions of the
Department of General Administration that exercise extensive admin-
istrative powers and functions. For the purposes of this discussion,
however, our attention will be concentrated upon the Division of Bank-
ing, and the substantially similar functions and procedures of the
Division of Savings & Loans will be omitted.
The supervisor of banking is empowered by statute to pass upon
applications for charters for (a) commercial banks, (b) industrial loan
companies, (c) small loan companies, and (d) mutual savings banks.
In some respects the procedures required by statute as regards all of
these financial institutions are similar, but, by and large, each is ruled
by a separate and distinct administrative process.
It is significant to note that the Division of Banking is not required
to adopt or promulgate rules and regulations prescribing its own pro-
cedures. Standards guiding the conduct of the supervisor in dealing
with these four types of institutions are set out by statute, but the
supervisor is vested with almost unlimited discretion. As regards com-
mercial banks and trust companies,' and industrial loan companies,'
the standards are couched in nearly identical terms. Stated generally,
it is incumbent upon the supervisor to determine three things from the
best source of information and such investigation as he deems neces-
sary: (1) whether the proposed bank will be honestly and efficiently
conducted in accordance with the law; (2) whether the location pro-
posed affords a reasonable promise of adequate support; and (3)
1 RCW 30.08.030.
2 RCIV 31.04.050.
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whether the bank is being formed for a legitimate purpose. Mutual
savings banks' and small loan companies4 have yet another condition
attached in that the supervisor may also consider and determine
whether the public convenience and advantage will be promoted by
incorporation of the bank or loan company.
On the administrative level, the most significant variance appears in
the obligation of the supervisor to accompany his "approval" or "re-
fusal" of articles of incorporation with findings of fact and a formal
order. When dealing with commercial banks and mutual savings banks,
no findings or formal orders are required in any case. When dealing
with industrial loan companies, findings are required on matters coming
before the supervisor after such companies have been incorporated, but
not where there is a refusal by the supervisor to grant a charter in the
first instance. Where licenses of small loan companies are in issue, the
supervisor is required to file findings of fact with the Division of Bank-
ing of the Department of Finance, Budget and Business.'
The applicable code provisions distinguish between the original
grant of the privilege of doing business and the problems which may
arise after a financial institution has assumed the privilege. In the
former case, the legislature has vested the supervisor with wide dis-
cretion, while more care is taken where rights and privileges have
been previously granted and the supervisor is performing his duty to
enforce the provisions of the law. However, there seems to be no
particular justification for distinguishing between various types of
financial institutions in the requirement of findings of fact and the
entry of a formal order. The fact that differences exist in the char-
acter of the business sought to be conducted would not appear to be
a sufficient basis for procedural distinctions. While uniformity is
desirable in this area, any defects are largely rectified by the appeal
provisions under which trials de novo are granted where there is no
record taken of proceedings before the administrative body.
Procedures on appeal are also widely varied. Commercial banks,
upon refusal of their articles of incorporation, have a right of appeal
within ten days to the superior court of Thurston County, the trial in
that court being de novo.6 Industrial loan companies follow the same
procedure where there is a refusal to grant a charter," but the scope
of review is limited to the record below where the appeal is taken from
3 RCW 32.08.040.
4 RCW 31.08.050.
5 Ibid.
6 RCW 30.08.040.
7 RCW 31.04.050.
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an order other than one involving appoval of articles of incorporation.'
The statute dealing with small loan companies contains a provision
that the trial in superior court shall be de novo, but this provision has
been held unconstitutional insofar as it permits the introduction of new
evidence on the trial court level.'" The time limit for appeals also
varies from commercial banks and industrial loan companies, in that
small loan companies have thirty days to perfect their appeal, and
the former types of institutions have but ten.
The method of appeal provided for mutual savings banks does not
follow the pattern of any of the above described procedures. The
statute provides that where the supervisor has refused to approve
articles of incorporation for such an institution, the bank has thirty
days to serve notice of appeal. The appeal is not to the superior court,
but to a board composed of the Governor, the Attorney General and
the Supervisor of Banking. The action of this board is declared to
be final by statute."
Although the issue on appeal is generally the classic one of "abuse
of discretion" or "arbitrary or capricious action," the example dearly
demonstrates the need for new legislation to provide a fair and expedi-
tious adversary hearing with fixed and determinable rules of pro-
cedure, as well as fair and reasonable provisions for appeal. The
Model State Administrative Procedure Act, by itself, would not fulfill
the need completely. It must be conceded that adoption of the Model
Act would establish the necessity for a hearing and the promulgation
and publication of rules and regulations. However, the appeal rules
may be corrected only by specific legislation which goes to the source
of the problem and creates uniformity in the methods of perfecting
an appeal.
Tax Commission.
This example demonstrates the employment of statutes which do
provide for a rudimentary method of administrative procedure,
although no fixed rules of procedure are established or printed. The
two different methods of appeal prescribed by statute are seldom
employed because in practice the exceedingly informal "hearings" have,
in general, resulted in field settlement of a large number of contro-
versies.
The Tax Commission's responsibilities involve three broad catego-
8 RCW 31.04.190.
9 RCW 31.08.260.
10 Household Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wn2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952).
11 RCW 32.08.050.
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ries: excise taxes; inheritance taxes and escheats; and property taxes.
Excise Taxes. Hearings, initiated by petition, are conducted by the
commission concerning correction of assessments and refunds of taxes
paid. 2 No particular form has been prescribed for such petitions.
The hearings, which usually take the form of a conference between
the taxpayer, his attorney and the commission, are informal, without
established rules of procedure. No record is made of the proceedings.
This system, where feasible, represents the epitome of administrative
procedures. The informal type "hearings" permit discussion between
the interested parties regarding the obligations of the taxpayer. This
is substantially the same procedure followed by the Internal Revenue
Service and has been, in large measure, successful. In this somewhat
specialized field, hearings may be informal and, in effect, nothing more
than negotiation, but the fact that no record is taken and a settlement
is effected does not make the proceeding any less a hearing. Such is
recognized administrative procedure and certainly no objection can
be raised against an amicable settlement at the administrative level,
although the hearing strikes more of negotiation.
Pursuant to statute" a taxpayer may appeal to the Thurston County
superior court from the commission's decision within thirty days of
the date of order. Such "appeal" is actually a trial de novo, and is
initiated in the same manner as any civil action.
Inheritance Taxes and Esckeats. There are no statutory provisions
for commission hearings with respect to inheritance tax controversies.
As a practice, disagreements between the taxpayers and the commis-
sion are discussed informally either with the commissioners or officers
of the Inheritance Tax Division. In those cases in which settlement
cannot be established in this manner, the issues are resolved by order
of the probate court in which the estate is being administered.
Property Taxes. With regard to property taxes, the commission acts
as an appellate tribunal."4 Hearings involve appeals from the decisions
of county boards of equalization relating to valuations made by county
assessors as equalized by the county board, as well as appeals by per-
sons considering themselves aggrieved by any taxing district levy.
Although there are no statutory provisions regulating such pro-
ceedings, the commission makes a practice of advising appellants
generally of the procedure which they will observe at the hearing.
Such advice takes the form of a "procedures brochure" which is a
12 RCW 82.32.160-170.
3 RCW 82.32.180.
24 RCW 84.08.130-140.
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mimeographed pamphlet explaining to the parties such things as
burden of proof, presumptions, etc. This particular form has been
in use by the commission for several years and is uniformly utilized.
The adoption of the Model Act would have little effect upon its use,
since the agencies are entitled to promulgate their own rules of pro-
cedure. This is substantially the effect of the procedures brochure, so
little change would be wrought. Presumably, however, under the
Model Act the commission would be required to file this brochure
with the Secretary of State and give notice to "interested persons"
whenever such rules came up for amendment. These would be in
variance with existing requirements, but the effect on the commission
would be nominal.
Essentially, as in other administrative proceedings, the hearings are
conducted on an informal basis though the testimony presented is
transcribed.
No subsequent appeal from the order of the commission is provided
for, the taxpayer's remedy being to pay the taxes in question and sue
for a refund in the superior court of the county in which the property
is situated.
Pollution Control Commission.
A study of this commission's activity is interesting because of its
concern with a fresh, relatively undeveloped concept of governmental
control which is becoming increasingly more essential to the develop-
ment of the state's health and welfare.
The commission itself is an ex officio body which functions through
a director appointed by the Governor and which is required to meet
at least bimonthly. Its power extends to the promulgation of rules
and regulations governing matters within its control.
Designated industries are required to secure a permit prior to dis-
charging wastes into public waters. 5 The form of application for such
permit is prescribed by rule, 6 and the director is authorized to estab-
lish and certify the conditions under which temporary permits are to
be granted.'
The administrative procedure established for the regulation of the
commission's business provides for an investigation of each application
by a technical staff under the supervision of the director. In the event
a temporary permit is to be issued, the director formally notifies the
15 §2, Rules and Regulations, Pollution Control Commission.
1 §3, Rules and Regulations, Pollution Control Commission.
17 §4, Rules and Regulations, Pollution Control Commission.
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applicant of the conditions attached, and such notice constitutes a
commission order for purposes of appeal."8 In order to effect an appeal,
applications for a hearing must be filed within fifteen days of receipt
of the director's order."
At this point it should be noted that a distinction has been made
between formal and informal hearings before the Pollution Control
Commission. Since June 9, 1955, the effective date of chapter 71,
Laws of 1955, which provides for formal appeals, there have been
only two formal hearings conducted. The obvious reason for this is
that the statute provides additionally that the applicant may, upon
petition, be accorded a series of informal hearings in which he may
offer justification for a request for either alleviation of the conditions
imposed or an extension of time to comply with the conditions. No
fixed procedure has been established for the conduct of these hearings,
the applicant being permitted to make any showing that he may
desire, with or without counsel.
Should the applicant object to the ruling of the director upon formal
hearing, he may appeal to the superior court of the county in which
the petitioner has its plant or some portion thereof. The order of
the commission becomes final unless such appeal is filed within fifteen
days of the issuance of the order.
Appeals to the superior court are tried de novo as a cause in equity."
Liquor Control Board.
The procedures of the Washington State Liquor Control Board
demonstrate an agency with broad powers at the administrative level
since it exercises a fundamental police power. The rules for pro-
cedures are well developed, are published and are available for dis-
tribution.
The statutes dealing with the Liquor Control Board do not require
it to grant hearings respecting the issuance, denial, suspension or can-
cellation of permits or licenses. The powers of the board are summary
in nature. As a matter of long-standing policy, however, these sum-
mary powers have been tempered, with the result that the board does
not suspend a license unless the licensee has admitted the charges in
writing and waived formal hearing, or else the board has sustained
the charge after a formal hearing as provided in its regulations.
The regulation describing the administrative hearing procedure
18 RCW 90.48.210.
19 RCW 90.48.130.
20 Ibid.
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calls for a written complaint containing all charges, to be signed by
a board member. The board's case is presented by an assistant
attorney general before an appointed trial examiner. It is prescribed
that the hearing shall be conducted in the same manner, so far as it
is practicable, as are superior court trials. There are provisions in this
regulation for such matters as continuances, receiving of depositions,
counsel for the licensee and the taking of testimony and evidence by
a reporter. At the conclusion of the hearing the licensee may inform
the examiner of his desire to be heard before the board."
However, within this same regulation it is stated that nothing con-
tained therein shall prevent the board from exercising the power given
it by statute to summarily suspend or cancel any license.22 Further-
more, the actions of the board as to permits or licenses, with or with-
out hearing, are final and not subject to review or restraint by any
court under the terms of a section of the original Liquor Act of 1933.2"
The granting of such broad, unrestrained power in the liquor board has
been characterized as necessary and proper considering the nature of
the problem. 2'
Unfortunately, the fact that the Liquor Control Board is exercising
police powers, and that the distribution of alcoholic beverages is purely
a matter of privilege and not of right, would not necessarily exclude
the Liquor Control Board from the provisions of a general law regu-
lating administrative processes. In order that its duties be effectuated,
the summary powers of such a board should not be curtailed. In an
area such as this, the consumption of time by declaratory judgments
and writs of review in contested cases might well be fatal to the effec-
tive administration of the law. The value of uniformity as opposed to
a reduction in the effectiveness of enforcing laws such as are under
consideration here, are factors which must be carefully weighed.
Employment Security Department.
Another example from the spectrum of administrative procedures
in use in Washington is the highly refined method of administrative
procedure utilized by the Employment Security Department. A rea-
sonable degree of formality coupled with readily available printed
rules of procedure is a far cry from the Banking Division rules.
At the outset, the benefit claimant or the liable employer is served
21 §114, Rules and Regulations, Liquor Control Board.
22 See RCW 66.24.030.
23 RCW 66.08.150.
21 State ex rel. Thornbury v. Gregory, 191 Wash. 70, 70 P.2d 788 (1937).
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with a benefit determination" or an assessment.2" If no appeal is
taken, the determination or assessment becomes final. If timely appeal
is taken, the parties appear before the Appeal Tribunals, which are
established within the department. 7 In this department there are six
appeal examiners, each of whom is considered a separate appeal tri-
bunal. At the present time none of the examiners are attorneys, but
they are all veterans of many years experience in the department.
The hearings are informal and common law rules of evidence need
not be observed, with the exception that the examiners may not base
their decisions entirely on hearsay evidence. In this connection, see
Leggerini v. Dept. of Unemployment Compensation,28 wherein the
Supreme Court stated that the decision of the commissioner must be
based on "competent" evidence. The proceedings before the appeal
tribunal must be recorded and the decision must be issued in writing.
The aggrieved party has a right to petition for review by the com-
missioner from the decision of the appeal tribunal." The commissioner
has the power to reverse, affirm, modify or remand. This decision
becomes final within thirty days unless appealed to the superior court."
The decision of the commissioner is subject to appeal to the superior
court within thirty days from the date of issuance. When the appeal
is perfected, the department appears and prepares the commissioner's
record in the case, which includes the sworn testimony taken before
the appeal tribunal and the various exhibits. No further evidence may
be introduced at the superior court level. The matter is tried strictly
on the record made below. The act provides that the decision of the
commissioner shall be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof
shall be upon the party attacking the same.
Thus we observe that the Employment Security Department is one
of a few administrative agencies which is required by statute to follow
certain procedures resulting in a degree of formality infrequently found
among the administrative processes of the state of Washington.
25 RCW 50.20.180.
26 RCW 50.32.030.
27 RCW 50.32.010.
28 15 Wn.2d 618, 131 P.2d 729 (1942).
29 RCW 50.32.070.
SO RCW 50.32.090.
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APPENDIX
Provision for Hearings Volume of HearingsAgency Method of JudicialAgnyStatutes Agency UneoddReview
(RCW) Regulations Unrecorded Recorded
Tax Commission: Thurston County su-
Excise Tax Div. 82.32.160-.170 None 30 perior court, de novo.
Probate court where es-
Inher. Tax. Div. None None Unknown tate pending, de novo.
Prop. Tax Div. 84.08.130-.140 None 4 After tax payment, suit
for refund in superior
court of county
wherein xroper tyis located
Dept. of Public Superior court of county
Assistance 74.08.070 Yes 140 of residence,
on record.
Employment Security Superior court, on the
Dept. 50.32.010-.090 Yes 2699 record.
Dept. of Gen. Adm.: After supervisor's re-
Banking None None 100 fusal, to superior
court of ThurstonCounty, de novo.
To special board in
mutual savings cases.Savings & Loans None None 15-20 Superior court of county
wherein located,
de novo.
State Employee's rJThurston County su-Retirement Board 41.40.412-.419 Yes 40 perior court, de novo.
Su t. of Public 28.70.170, Superior court of county
instruction 28.88.030 None 6 wherein dispute arose,
de novo.
Liquor Control Board 66.24.040 Yes 198 None as to permits or
licenses; presumably
to superior court as to
other matters.
Pollution Control Comm. 90.48.130 None 400 Superior court of county
wherein plant located,
de novo.
Det.of Highways: Superior court of
e ces Thurston County,
Facilities 47.52.072-.074 Yes 8 on the record.
Franchises on
Highways 47.44.010-.020 Yes 99 None by statute.
Dept. of Agriculture None None 80-100 None generally providedby statute.
Public Service Comm. 30.04.020, Yes 900 Generally, superior court
.110-.120 of Thurston County
on the record.
Board of Volunteer
Firemen 41.24.290 None 1 None by statute.
Dept. of Natural 76.14.090, None Infrequent Superior court of county
Resources 76.40.124, wherein lands
76.40.125, affected situated,76.40.127 de novo.
Commissioner of 78.20.040, None Infrequent Superior court of county
Public Lands 73.20.070, wherein lands affected
79.16.250 situated, de novo.
Oil & Gas Conservation 78.52.070, Yes Infrequent Superior court of
Committee 78.52.220, Thurston County,
78.52.240, on the record.
78.52.380,78.52.470
Board of Industrial Superior court of county
Insurance Appeals 51.52.100 Yes 1200 wherein claimant re-
sides or injury oc-
curred, on the record.
Game Commission 77.28.120, None 6.10 Superior court of county
77.32.280 of residence, presum-
ably on the record.
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NOTES ON APPENDIX
(1) The statutes here set out are not necessarily the only authority for administrative
hearings in each cited agency. Particularly, there has been no attempt to include
provisions for rule-making, this discussion being limited to hearings for the de-
termination of specific rights and interests.
(2) Although regulations have never been adopted and promulgated, a number of agen-
cies adhere to certain procedures as to which the parties are generally advised
prior to the hearing.
(3) The number of annual hearings given is only approximate in many cases, the exact
number being unknown or varying from year to year.
(4) A good many agencies known to conduct hearings of some sort are not included
here due to the difficulty of obtaining information. Under the Department of
Licenses alone, there are hearings conducted as to accountants, barbers, beauti-
cians, chiropractors, dentists, drugless healers, embalmers, engineers, surveyors,
maternity home operators, midwives, nursing home operators, optometrists, osteo-
paths, pharmacists, physicians, nurses. psychologists, realtors, veterinarians and
others. In some cases the director of the department conducts such hearings, while
in others a special board is responsible.
